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I INTRODUCTION 
On 17 April 2007 the Supreme Court considered whether Susan Couch's claim 
seeking exemplary damages for alleged failure by the Crown and those responsible 
for supervising the parole of William Bell should be struck out. 1 The decision is still 
pending, but if the Court finds the Crown to be negligent, then this decision may 
determine the current test for exemplary damages. It may also throw some light on 
why some victims of personal injury involving public authorities have lost 
confidence in the state sector and are willing to seek justice through the arduous 
process of litigation. 
A Facts 
The facts of events leading up to the horrific attack by William Bell on 8 
December 2001 against four employees at the Panrnure RSA premises will not be 
fully disclosed until it reaches a jury trial. Susan Couch was the only victim who 
survived the attack, although with permanent neurological damage. At the time of 
the attack, Mr Bell was on parole for aggravated robbery of a service station. It is 
alleged by the appellant that there was a total failure by the parole officer to ensure 
Mr Bell met the conditions of his parole. The appellant claims that any reasonable 
probation officer would have realised that the breach increased the risk of Mr Bell re-
offending and consequently should have warned the people he had worked with at 
the RSA. 
William Bell was found guilty in the High Court at Auckland for three counts 
of murder and one of attempted murder. Susan Couch along with Tai Hobson, a 
1 Susan Couch v Th e Attorney-General ( 17 April 2007) Hearing SC 49/2006 Chief Justice, Blanchard J, 
Tipping J, McGrath J, Anderson J. 
6 
husband of one of the murder victims, were not satisfied with the criminal 
punishment of Mr Bell and sued the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Department 
for Corrections, "seeking compensatory and exemplary damages in respect of alleged 
failures by those responsible for supervising the terms of parole"2• In their eyes the 
system had failed them. The defendant applied and succeeded in striking out the 
claim on the grounds that there was no reasonable cause of action. 
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court struck out Mr 
Hobson's claims for negligence (for nervous shock) and the claim for misfeasance by 
both Mr Hobson and Ms Couch on the grounds that the probation officer did not do a 
deliberate act which was not in their power to do3• The split came with the 
negligence claim for Ms Couch. For the majority, William Young P and Chambers J 
considered that Ms Couch's claim in negligence should be struck out. Hammond J 
would have kept Ms Couch's claim in negligence live. 
Six years after the attack, Susan Couch succeeded in her application for leave 
to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided the cause of action 
based on misfeasance in public office could not succeed, but granted leave relating to 
the negligence cause of action and exemplary damages. 4 If the action succeeds she 
will then be able to go back to the High Court for a jury trial. 
B Issues 
The overriding issue from this case is the intersection between common law 
and the Accident Compensation regime. The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Act 2001 bars proceedings for compensatory damages for personal 
2 Hobson v Attorney-General [2005] 2 NZLR 220 (HC) Heath J. 
3 Hobson v Attorney-General [2007] I NZLR 374, para 97 (CA) Hammond J. 
4 Susan Couch v Attorney- General [2006] NZSC 66 Judgment of the Court. 
7 
injuries covered by the Act but does not bar proceedings for exemplary damages. 
Therefore Ms Couch first has to prove that her personal injuries were caused by the 
defendant ' s negligence, and then has to meet the test for exemplary damages. 
The difficulty for the judiciary in interpreting this can be seen by comments on 
the purpose of exemplary damages in the Court of Appeal decision. Hammond J 
suggested that tort law has been overshrunk as a consequence of the accident 
compensation scheme which does not address adequately the need for social and 
public accountability when the actions of institutions, such as the probation services, 
result in "appalling kinds of events to be left in the quagmire of an inadequate 
institutional response"5• In Hammond J's view "there was real force in the view that 
such a new claim in negligence may align with traditional rationales for tort law, 
including public accountability. 11 6 
Chambers J held that even if the negligent claim could have succeeded, 
exemplary damages were "unsustainable in the vicarious liability context"7 • He also 
considered that if the Department of Corrections was put under threat of exemplary 
damages every time a parolee re-offended, they would be over-cautious to the 
detriment of the offender's rehabilitation and in the long-term society's best interest. 8 
Therefore, Hammond J is suggesting the courts address the lack of 
accountability of public authorities through the use of tort law, while Chambers J 
wants to keep tight reins on the use of tort law and is cautious of meddling with 
public policy issues that should be left to Parliament. 
5 Hobson v Attorney-General above n 3, para 75, Hammond J. 
6 Justice Hammond and Joel Harrison, Court of Appeal Report for 2006 (Conference of judges of the 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court of New Zealand, March 2007) 69 . 
7 Hobson v Attorney-General above n 3 para 153 , Chambers J. 
8 Hobson v Attorney-Genera! above n 3 para 175, Chambers J. 
8 
The Supreme Court judiciary at the hearing closely questioned the counsel on 
who the cause of action should be against; what the purpose of exemplary damages 
was; and what the test for exemplary damages should be. 
This case typifies the failing of the Accident Compensation regime for victims 
such as Susan Couch who have lost confidence in the state sector and are willing to 
seek justice through the court system. To explain this loss of confidence it is 
necessary to look at factors contributing to the way society, policies and the law has 
changed since the introduction of the regime in 1974. Only once this is understood 
can we consider how situations similar to the Couch case can be prevented in the 
future, or at least dealt with in a more accountable and just way. 
II RELEVANT FACTORS 
A Original Accident Compensation regime 
The main purpose in replacing the common law system of tort action and 
employer liability insurance with a comprehensive statutory based accident 
compensation scheme in 19729 was to have a fairer and more equal system for the 
protection of all citizens. The scheme was based on the Woodhouse Report of 
1967 10• In later years Sir Owen Woodhouse, chairperson of the Royal Commission, 
described three reasons for the Report 11 • First, the negative argument that the 
common law system was inadequate; unfair; ignored rehabilitation; and was 
expensive. Second, the community should also be responsible for accidents as 
society itself had built up and encouraged heavily risk-laden activities undertaken for 
9 Accident Compensation Act 1972. 
'
0 Royal Commission oflnquiry Compensation for Personal Jnju,y in New Zealand (Govenunent Printer, 
1967). 
11 Sir Owen Woodhouse "Aspects of the Accident Compensation Scheme" [l 979] NZLJ 395. 
9 
the convenience and utility of society. And thirdly, the principle of community 
responsibility carries with it the equitable principle of comprehensive entitlement. 
The aim of the reform was to use the amount of money already spent on 
accident compensation in a much fairer and equitable way. To do this successfully it 
was necessary to destroy the common law system for "if the common law survived, a 
comprehensive system for injury was unattainable and new resources of revenue 
would be needed rather than making better use of existing money." 12 Therefore, a 
social contract was made between the public and Parliament to give up the right to 
sue in exchange for guaranteed compensation for personal injury. The public trusted 
the government to look after them for the good of the community. 
B Development of the scheme 
However, as with all legislative schemes, the scheme has been amended over 
the years by different governments according to their policies and the social and 
economic trends of the day. In 1992 13 the removal of lump sum payments meant that 
"persons unable to prove a loss of income received no financial redress for their \ 
injuries under the legislation14. The 1992 amendment also removed nervous shock 
claims from ACC cover and instigated rigorous work capacity procedures to 
encourage Jong te1m claimants to return to some form of employment. By the mid-
1990s injured people covered by the Act were increasingly consulting lawyers 
looking for alternative means of compensation. 15 
12 Geoffrey Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979) 25. 
13 Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. 
14 Alisa Duffy "The Common law response to the Accident Compensation scheme" in Conference Papers 
- Looking Back at Accident Compensation: Finding Lessons for the Future (Victoria University of 
Wellington, Faculty of Law, NZ Centre for Public Law, 2-3 August 2001). 
15 John Miller "Trends in personal injury litigation: The 1990s" 34(2) [2003] VUWLR 407, 408. 
10 
An amendment in 1998 16 allowed private insurance companies to deal with 
workplace injuries, thus introducing a private market approach to the Scheme. The 
privatisation was later repealed and the lump sums reintroduced in 2001. However, 
the amendments along with lowering of compensation levels, showed the 
vulnerability of the Scheme to the whim of politicians. 
At the same time the common law began to creep back in, again moving away 
from the social contract of the original scheme. Numerous cases followed the 1992 
Act claiming both for nervous shock and also exemplary damages. 
While the early Accident Compensation legislation received strong judicial 
support, "legislation's retreat from a comprehensive accident compensation 
scheme ... caused the courts to be more sympathetic to attempts to revive common 
law actions" 17• These developments must also be looked at in the wider context of 
the social and economic trends at the time. 
C State sector 
The Accident Compensation regime was introduced at a high point in the belief 
in 'cradle to grave' social welfare18 and a dominant public sector. Since then New 
Zealand society and the state sector in particular have undergone fundamental 
change. Reforms influenced by the free-market ideology were brought in to make 
the state sector more efficient. 19 
At the same time the state sector became subject to a range of controls 
designed to ensure transparency, and accountability. The two trends, in a way, can 
16 Accident Insurance Act 1998 . 
17 Alisa Duffy, above n 14, 1. 
18 Carol Harlow State liability: tort law and beyond (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 96 . 
19 State Sector Act 1988; Public Finance Act 1989; State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. 
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be said to be competing as while the State is being asked to become more efficient, 
public authorities are also being asked to be more accountable. 
As a result of the conflicting trends, it was inevitable that the public became 
increasingly dissatisfied with a state sector straining under the pressure. Academic, 
Bob Gregory, suggests that this has resulted in accountability becoming a difficult 
issue with "reputation-protecting games and blame games"20 being used to protect 
vulnerable ministers and officials. Or as Hammond J stated "there is the difficulty 
that "the state will look after itself'21• This could be interpreted to mean that while the 
judiciary is independent, the state is in danger or protecting their executive, thereby 
reducing the incentive to be truly responsible for their mistakes that may affect 
victims such as Susan Couch. 
Not surprisingly the Accident Compensation regime was caught up in these 
trends resulting in a lack of commitment by both the State and the public to the 
original idea of a social contract. This is shown by the increase in personal injury 
cases against public authorities such as health care22 , social welfare23 and prison 
authorities24 . Public authorities, must, under law, fulfill the Government's social 
objectives that are presumably made in the public interest but with strained 
resources. The overall vision of the Department of Corrections, for example, is "[t]o 
focus on our primary outcome of safer communities by protecting the public and 
reducing re-offending through people performance quality and as a result have the 
New Zealand public's trust and confidence,"25 at least arguably. 
20 Bob Gregory "Bringing back the buck: responsibility and accountability in politics and the state sector" 
(2007) 30(2) Public Sector, 4. 
21 Hobson v Attorney-General above n 3, para 75, Hammond J. 
22 For example A v Bottrill [2003] 2 NZLR 721 (PC) Nicholls LJ (Hope and Rodger LJJ concurring) 
Hutton and Millett LJJ dissenting. 
23 For example S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 (CA) Blanchard for the Court. 
24 For example Attorney-General v Taunoa [2006] 2 NZLR 457 (CA) Judgment of the Court. 
25 Department of Corrections Vision and values 
<http: /www.corrections.govt.nz/public/aboutus/visionva lues.> (accessed 2 August 2007). 
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However, these trends may be changing for the better as the current 
Government acknowledges the need to improve the state sector effectiveness and 
accountability. This is shown in the 2005 Labour Party manifesto which promised to 
"rebuild our services from the pared-back state of the 1990s."26 The State Services 
Commissioner now has a mandate to rebuild an appropriate state sector ethos and 
strengthen the trust in state services. 27 Whether these changes will affect the number 
of personal injury cases seeking exemplary damages is yet to be seen. 
D Department of Corrections 
The purpose of the Probation Service is to both rehabilitate the released 
offender and at the same time protect the public. At the time of the offence this 
framework was set out in section 107(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 198528 which 
says the Parole Board may impose special conditions on the offender in order to 
protect the public who may be affected by the release of the offender or for the 
rehabilitation of the offender. The parole officer has a statutory authority under 
section 125 of the same Act to supervise the offender and ensure all conditions of the 
release are complied with. The appellant argued that as there had been a total failure 
by the Parole officer in rehabilitating the offender there was an increased need to 
protect the public. 29 
At the time of the offending in 2001 the Department acknowledged that there 
was a "hopelessly under-resourced, under-trained, under-supported Probation 
Service"30 • There was not enough money to fund the Mangare Center or enough 
26 Labour Party Manifesto 2005 187. 
27 Bob Gregory above n 20, 4 . 
28 Criminal Justice Act 1985 s107(c) was repealed in 2002 bys l 66(a) Sentencing Act 2002. 
29 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n I , 15 Henry. 
30 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n I, 44 Pike. 
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psychologists. 31 The appellant suggests this contributed to William Bell's re-
offending. 
The situation did not improve greatly after the RSA attack as shown by the 
Department's Briefing to the Incoming Government in 2005:32 
Recruitment and retention are also issues in the Community Probation Service. The Service has 
had a 25% increase in its Probation Officer staffing levels over the last three years. This was in 
recognition of significant volume issues following the 2002 sentencing and parole legislation, 
and to improve the quality of service delivery from poor to satisfactory. Metropolitan areas, 
particularly Auckland, have had some difficulty in recruiting staff at all levels. This remains an 
issue for the Service. 
Apart from recruitment of staff, there have been other problems with the parole 
system as shown by the recent example of Graeme Burton who killed Karl 
Kuchenbecker and injured four others while breaching his parole for a previous 
conviction for murder. There was found to be numerous breakdowns throughout the 
system that resulted in Burton being paroled when he should not have and Judge 
David Carruthers, Chairman of the Parole Board, publicly accepted responsibility 
and promised changes.33 
The Burton case showed how difficult it is to get the balance right between 
rehabilitation of offenders and public safety. The Sensible Sentencing Trust would 
say the justice system favours offenders over victims and public safety should be 
paramount. However, this is a short term argument as without giving serious attempt 
31 Susan Couch v Attorney-Genera! above n I, 50 Pike. 
32 Department of Corrections, Post-Election Brief (October 2005) 
<http:/. \VWw.corrections.govt.nz/public/pdf/b rief- incoming-minister/briefing- incomi ng-minister-
2005 11.pdf> (accessed 15 July 2007). 
33 Mike Houlahan "Parole still best way for convicted to re-enter society, says judge" ( 4 July 2007) New 
Zealand Herald Auckland 2. 
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to re-enter offenders into society they would only present long term risks to pubic 
safety as well as a huge financial cost to scarce public resources. 
The Burton killing occurred at the time of reform to the Criminal Justice Act 
1985. Karl Kuchenbecker's father was able to make a submission to Justice and 
Electoral Select Committee and the Criminal Justice Reform Bill was passed on 25 
July 2007. In relation to parole, the amendments "spelt out that parole was a 
privilege and not a right. . . and allowed the commission of police to apply to have a 
parolee sent back to jail in some circumstances 11 34• Therefore, this shows that some 
improvements will naturally come from the failing of a public body depending on 
whether Parliament is already looking at reform in the area and also depending on 
the publicity the situation receives . 
E Accident prevention 
Partly as a result of these social and political trends, public authorities now take 
greater risks to be efficient and when, as a consequence, accidents happen, the . 
Accident Compensation regime does little to hold these public authorities 
accountable. As Blanchard J stated in S v Attorney-General: "[i]t can be said that in 
a jurisdiction with a no-fault accident compensation scheme and a bar on ordinary 
personal injury claims there are insufficient incentives to eliminate or reduce 
systematic negligence. "35 
However, this may not be the fault of the original Accident Compensation 
scheme as the Woodhouse Report proposed that the prevention of accidents must be 
dealt with by a separate branch36 • Sir Owen Woodhouse later described this as "an 
34 "Criminal justice reform legislation passes" (July 26 2007) Newswire, NZPA. 
35 S v Attorney-General above n 23. 
36 Royal Commission of Inquiry, above n!O, 19. 
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independent body, fully equipped both to regulate and to enforce its regulations"37• 
Academic Richard Gaskin argues that "when Woodhouse recommended an end to 
personal injury lawsuits, he did not envision a world without deterrence. His scheme 
left clear space for a comprehensive accident prevention strategy that is still waiting 
to be discovered and implemented.38 
Government departments such as the Department of Labour and the State 
Services Commission have their own prevention strategies in place through the 
health and safety legislation39 and the reviewing of the performance of each Public 
Service department40• But the comprehensive accident prevention strategy envisaged 
by Sir Owen Woodhouse is still far from reality. 
F Use of tort law for public authorities 
Accident prevention is the one area where tort liability, at least in theory, 
trumps a statutory based compensation scheme. However, the question is whether 
tort liability, enforced by Courts under strict rules, would make public authorities 
more accountable and prevent accidents from occurring in the future or whether it 
would be to the detriment of wider public good as public authorities become overly 
cautious and reduce services. 
In theory, the basic rule in t01i law is that tort liability of public authorities is 
governed by the same principles as apply to private individuals. However, in 
practice, the effect and justification for punishment is different for public authorities 
and private bodies. This is because, generally, public authorities are less concerned 
37 Rt Hon Sir Owen Woodhouse "ACC: Integration or Demarcation?"(Rebuilding ACC Beyond 2000 
Conference, Wellington, 1999) 11. 
38 Richard Gasking "Recalling the future of ACC" [2000] VUWLR 215 , 222. 
39 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992. 
40 State Sector Act 1988 s6. 
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with profit making as compared to private bodies with an exception maybe for quasi 
governmental bodies such as state owned enterprises. Usually they respond better to 
political pressure rather than to financial pressure. It is also because the public 
expect public authorities to have higher standards of accountability than private 
bodies as they operate for the wider public good. 
These factors put into question the instrumentalist theory that "tort liability 
promotes efficient investments in safety by visiting financial consequences on those 
who under-invest in safety"41 • An American academic, Daryl Levinson, claims that:42 
when the political cost of diverting resources to loss prevention is sufficiently high, 
government will not make the investment even when it is economically justified ..... And since 
the economic costs of damages awards falls on taxpayers not responsible in any direct fashion 
for tortious conduct, the corrective-justice rationale ... is also wanting. 
There has been much criticism of Levinson's theories. It ignores the theory of 
corrective justice that "tort liability embodies a moral obligation of culpable parties 
to provide compensation for losses for which they are fairly considered 
responsible" 43• It also ignores the vulnerability of politicians and officials to bad 
publicity. One opponent of Levinson's theories, Lawrence Rosenthal, claims that 
elected officials are highly sensitive to tort liability as their primary objective is to 
win the next election and they are unlikely to do that if the public condemn their 
conduct.44 It has to be noted that these theories are about compensatory damages 
rather than exemplary damages. Exemplary damages for negligence make 
41 
Lawrence Rosenthal "A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and 
Takings" 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 797, 798. 
42 Lawrence Rosenthal, Ibid , 826. 
43 Lawrence Rosenthal, Ibid 798 . 
44 Lawrence Rosenthal, Ibid. 
17 
Rosenthal's theory even more relevant as the purpose of the damages is to punish the 
offender, thus potentially resulting in increased condemnation by the public. 
However, Levinson's point about the opportunity cost of diverting resources for 
loss prevention is a policy factor that was taken into account by the judges in both 
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court hearings for Susan Couch's case. Unlike 
the private sector45, the state sector does not have unlimited resources to pay damages 
for torts liability. Generally this makes the courts wary of punishing public 
authorities as they are concerned that if public authorities are continually sued they 
will start to use defensive tactics and reduce services just to avoid potential liability. 
The Hill v Chief Constable46 decision was used in the hearing to show that if 
exemplary damages was a real possibility "it would just make operations of the 
Police so difficult if they had to be continually covering themselves against this type 
of claim that overall there was a real public downside that the Police wouldn't 
function properly"47 • However, Blanchard J balanced this argument by asking 
whether the allocation question would be a sufficient reason not to impose a duty of 
care if the Corrections built prisons with very thin walls because there was not 
enough money and as a consequence the prisoners got out. 48 His point was that the 
Court needs some way to prevent or punish outrageous conduct by public authorities 
in case it is not done by Parliament. The fact that public authorities are allocated 
scarce resources does not mean they should have immunity from being punished for 
endangering public safety. 
The Levinson argument only considers the short-term political expediency and 
does not take into account the accountability of public sector to an elected in 
45 For example the Ford Pinto case, as seen in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. ( I 98 I) 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 
(4th Dist). 
46 Hi// v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] A C. 53 (HL) Keith LJ for the Court. 
47 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n 1, 51 Blanchard J. 
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Government. It also does not take into account the fact that the threat of court 
action, surrounding publicity, and judicial condemnation can have sobering effects 
on public officials. 
III EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 
A Purpose of Exemplary Damages 
The fact that compensatory damages cannot be given by the judiciary for 
personal injury claims, means the test for exemplary damages is unique compared to 
other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom. However, the real purpose of 
exemplary damages is still not settled. According to the counsel for the appellant, 
Susan Couch's purpose in claiming exemplary damages was a mixture of vindication 
of her version of events; public acknowledgement that something went horribly 
wrong; and a degree of therapeutic value in knowing society does not condone those 
failures. 49 
I Punishment 
In theory the purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate the plaintiff 
for his or her loss and to make them 'whole' again, while the primary purpose of 
exemplary damages is to punish the defendant for outrageous conduct.50 While one 
focuses on the victim, the other focuses on the defendant. 
48 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n 1, 54 Blanchard J. 
49 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n 1, 36 Henry. 
50 Joanna Manning "Reflections on Exemplary Damages and Personal Injury Liability in New Zealand" 
[2002] NZ Law Review 143, 145. 
19 
Exemplary damages has been used in tort Jaw since around the mid 1870s to 
punish "high-handed, insolent, vindictive or malicious' behaviour.51 The Court of 
Appeal in New Zealand took a sympathetic even expansionary approach to 
exemplary damages until they became wary of exemplary damages being used to top 
up compensation. 52 In 1982 the Court of Appeal in Donselaar v Donselaar53 held 
that exemplary damages fell outside the statutory bar on damages for personal injury 
covered by the Accident Compensation scheme. In reaction, the courts moved 
towards using exemplary damages for narrow punitive purposes. 
Punishment is also recognised overseas as the primary purpose of exemplary 
damages as seen by the Australian courts54, by the Law Commission in the United 
Kingdom55 and the Ontario Law Commission56 • 
Another reason for some judges to be reluctant to use exemplary damages is 
that punishment has traditionally been seen as the purpose of criminal law rather than 
civil law. The 1998 Daniels v Thompson57 decision said the purpose of exemplary 
damages is to punish a person for the act he or she has committed, therefore, if they 
have already been punished in the criminal court, exemplary damages would mean 
double punishment.58 Parliament disagreed and in effect reversed the decision by 
enacting section 319(2) of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Act 2001 which allowed exemplary damages to be awarded regardless of the results 
of criminal proceedings. 
51 Joanna Manning, Ibid 145. 
52 Joanna Manning, Ibid 152. 
53 Donselaar v Donselaar [ 1982] 1 NZLR 97 , 107 (CA) Cooke, Richardson, Somers JJ. 
54 Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1, 9 (HCA) Gleeson CJ, McHugh , Gummow and 
Hayne JJ. 
55 United Kingdom Law Commission Aggravated, Exemplwy and Restitutionary Damages, (LC247, 
London, 1997). 
56 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Exemplary Damages (Ontario, J 991) 38-39 . 
57 Daniels v Thompson [ 1998] 3 NZLR 22 , 29-30 (CA) Henry J for the Court. 
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II Deterrence 
Deterrence is a major factor in tort liability as seen by the two theories of 
distributive justice and corrective justice. While punishment looks at the conduct at 
issue to detennine if punishment is deserved, deterrence is forward-looking and 
seeks to influence the behaviour of all potential actors. 59 In practice this difference is 
not so distinctive as seen in Bottrill v Attorney-General where Richardson P noted 
that once an award reflecting the punitive purpose is made, "[d]eterrence is then 
achieved as a consequence of the appropriate punishment of the wrongdoer"60 • 
There has been a shift in recent years in the United States and Canada from the 
traditional punitive role to a general deterrence rationale for the use of exemplary 
damages. 61 American academics following a law and economics movement contend 
that the tort system serves two purposes "to compensate victims for individual harms 
and to deter injurers from perpetuating social harms"62 • Two such academics, 
Professors Polinsky and Shavell, have argued that the true purpose of punitive 
damages is to fill the enforcement gap left when compensatory damages are not 
awarded to victims for various reasons. 63 
This could be interpreted to justify an increased use of exemplary purposes in 
New Zealand due to the bar on compensatory damages in the Accident 
Compensation legislation. Cooke J in Donselaar v Donselaar suggested exemplary 
damages would have to perform alone the punitive and deterrent role formerly 
performed by the compensatory damages in personal injury cases.64 However, most 
58 Daniels v Thompson Ibid. 
59 Joanna Manning, above n 50, 149. 
60 Bottrill v A [200 I] 3 NZLR 622 para 42 (CA) Richardson J. 
61 Joanna Manning, above n 50, 149. 
62 
"Developments in the Law: The Paths of Civil Litigation" (May, 2000) 113(7) Harvard Law Review, 
1752, 1795. 
63 Developments in the Law, Ibid , 1795. 
64 Donselaar v Donselaar above n 53. 
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judiciary are cautious of using exemplary damages to fill the gap of compensatory 
damages as seen by Tipping J in S v Attorney-General: 65 
The deterrent effect of liability to pay compensatory damages is as far as it is appropriate to go. 
The fact that such damages cannot be awarded for personal injury should not be allowed to skew 
the issue of deterrence beyond what is reasonable and in the interests of society as a whole . 
It is interesting that Tipping J (who is on the Supreme Court bench for the 
Couch case) acknowledges that, in some cases, it may be in the interests of society as 
a whole to use exemplary damages for the purpose of deterrence. Whether Susan 
Couch's case is such a case is still to be decided. 
III Accountability 
Professor Carol Harlow maintains that public tum to tort law "to secure 
accountability for decision-making after other means of public accountability have 
failed". 66 An example she gives is the Hillsborough accident in the United Kingdom 
when poor policing of a football stadium resulted in death. A public inquiry67 was 
held, but the victims and their families still sought tort action. This however, proved 
to be a poor vehicle for accountability as the actions failed. 68 
Public accountability, however, is different from accountability of the decision-
maker at fault. Ms Couch's counsel in the hearings said it is "not an issue of public 
accountability, it's an issue of the victim being able to have the wrongdoer account to 
65 S v Attorney-General above n 23 , para 123 Tipping J. 
66 Carol Harlow, above n 18, 49. 
67 Lord Justice Taylor Final Report into the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster (HMSO, 1990). 
68 For example Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [ 1992) 1 A.C. 310 (HL) Keith, Ackner, 
Oliver, Jauncey, Lowry LJJ. 
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her" 69 • This is the type of accountability that Hammond J suggested is where tort law 
could be expanded. 70 
Susan Couch's case has been funded by the Sensible Sentencing Trust who 
claim "parole should be abolished for ALL repeat offenders or violent criminals'171 • 
They say that if the case does not get to court they will seek a law change to ensure 
that victims can seek redress in such cases. 72 Therefore, the Trust has used this case 
as a publicity vehicle or "tin opener" to try and get Parliament to see that there is 
need for serious change. 
IV Therapeutic purpose 
Exemplary damages has also been said to have a therapeutic purpose to the 
plaintiff by mitigating the offence. However, as Blanchard J pointed out in S v 
Attorney-General, the therapeutic purpose helps the argument that the true offender 
should be punished, rather than the employer. 73 It also helps the argument that strike 
out applications resulting in delay in court action are unfair on claimants, such as 
Susan Couch, who may be recovering physically and mentally from a crime. 
Therefore, whether being awarded exemplary damages really has a therapeutic effect 
on a claimant depends on their specific circumstances. 
V Compensation 
The New Zealand judiciary became very wary of exemplary damages being 
used to top up Accident Compensation entitlements as this would, in effect, 
69 Susan Couch v Attorney-Genera/ above n I , 36 Henry. 
70 Hobson v Attorney-Genera/ above n 3, para 97 Hammond J. 
71 Sensible Sentencing Trust "Parole in a Civilised Society?" (25 July 2007) NZPA. 
72 "Trust to Seek Law Change if RSA Victim's Court Bid Fails" (18 April 2007) Newsroom. 
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reintroduce damages for personal injury which would be against Parliament's intent. 
This caution increased after the lump sums were abolished in 1992. 
Although Susan Couch has said she is not seeking exemplary damages for 
compensatory purposes, compensatory damages were claimed up to the Court of 
Appeal stage. Ms Couch's did not receive income-related accident compensation 
because she was working only part-time when she was injured. 74 Instead she is on an 
invalid ' s benefit. Because of the timing of the attack she did not receive a lump sum 
payment. This shows how some injured victims are not looked after by the Accident 
Compensation regime and consequently find it difficult to recover from their injuries. 
One argument could be that if the Accident Compensation regime gave 
compensation at a level similar to what the common law would give for 
compensatory damages, then victims like Susan Couch would be more satisfied with 
the system. 
The message is that when a victim has been so badly let down by a public 
authority that was responsible for their safety, there is a mixture of reasons claimants 
go to court which can conflict with the intention of Parliament and the interpretation 
of the purpose of the remedy by the judiciary. 
B Parliament's intention 
As discussed, successive governments have amended the Accident 
Compensation legislation so it no longer reflects the original purpose of real 
compensation and comprehensive entitlement. 
Parliamentary intention is taken seriously by the judiciary as seen in the 
hearing when Tipping J said "we've got all sorts of issues in that area as to whether 
73 S v Attorney-Genera/ above n 23 , para 90 Blanchard J. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELL.INGTON 
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or not we can simply say "well actually Parliament, you're quite wrong" 75 • However, 
the courts can use wide discretion in the interpretation of Parliament's intent. 
Applied to the Couch case, Elias CJ said in the hearing: 76 
exemplary damages in an ACC context may be necessary to express denunciation for conduct, 
in other words we used to have damages of a farthing so that people could get judgment for 
some sort of redress. I'm not sure that mightn't be in part what Parliament was looking for. 
In other words Parliament may have intended the Courts to use exemplary 
damages to allow victims of negligence to get some form of redress that the Accident 
Compensation regime does not allow. This is obviously one area where the judicial 
use of exemplary damages can effect the way the legislation is amended in the future. 
C Judicial test 
I Negligence 
The respondent in the Supreme Court hearing argued that, accordin'g to the 
facts , there were fundamental problems with proximity, causation and vicarious 
liability in the claim for negligence, and therefore, exemplary damages had no real 
possibility77 • The purpose of this essay is not to dissect the duty of care issue, but 
rather to acknowledge the connections between negligence and exemplary damages 
and how this may affect judicial decision-making. 
Exemplary damages will not even be considered in these circumstances until 
negligence is found to have occurred. However, the fact that exemplary damages are 
74 "Debts climb as RSA survivor recovers" (3 September 2007) Dominion Post Wellington Al. 
75 ' ' Susan Couch v Attorney-Genera! above n 1, 85 Tipping J. 
76 Susan Couch v Attorney-Genera! above n I , 86 Elias CJ. 
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the only form of redress for proceedings involving personal injury can make the test 
for negligence more difficult for claimants. For example, one way to prevent the 
abuse of exemplary damages is for the courts to use policy reasons, such as the 
opportunity cost of redirecting scarce resources, to reduce the potential for public 
authorities to be found liable for negligence. Another way is to make the cause of 
action difficult to prove. Applied to the Couch case, it may be difficult to prove that 
Ms Couch was at a higher risk of harm compared to the general public.78 
Strike out proceedings are also encouraged by the Courts to prevent juries 
sympathetic to victims such as Susan Couch from mixing up the purpose of 
compensatory and exemplary damages as "once the result of the strike out is known 
the parties usually settle" 79• 
Courts may use the quantum of damages to discourage negligence cases in the 
area of personal injury. The Court of Appeal signaled curtailment of large claims in 
Ellison v L where $250,000 exemplary damages had been claimed against a dentist. 80 
In A v Bottrill Young J noted that "an award of $20,000 to $30,000 would stop 
virtually any claim for exemplary damages as there would be nothing left after 
deducting legal and other expenses" 81• 
In McDermott v Wallace the Court of Appeal used the test for quantum of 
damages from Rookes v Barnard82 and added considerations for: whether the 
claimant had received awards of compensation; whether the defendant had received a 
criminal penalty; and the conduct of the parties. 83 This rather strenuous test has 
77 Susan Couch v Attorney-Genera! (Department of Corrections) , (Respondent's Case in Opposition to 
Application for Leave to Appeal) SC 49/2006, para 27. 
78 Susan Couch v Attorney-Genera! above nl Tipping J 76 . 
79 Alisa Duffy, above nl4, 19. 
80 Ellison v L [ 1998] 1 NZLR 416 (CA) Blanchard J for the Court . 
81 A v Bottri/1 (I 9 March 1999) High Court Auckland CP 310/96 Young J. 
82 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL) Judgment of the Court . 
83 McDermott v Wallace [2005] 3 NZLR 661 paras 100-102 (CA) Judgment for the Court. 
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enough discretion for the judiciary to keep the level of damages moderate if they 
wish. 
Another hurdle is that family members find it very difficult to win negligence 
claims due to problems with duty of care as seen with Tai Hobson.84 This seems 
contrary to the punitive purpose of exemplary damages as surely it does not matter if 
the family of a victim who has died as a result of the negligence makes a claim on 
their behalf. 
Finally the difficulty in seeking exemplary damages on a vicarious basis limits 
the duty of care arguments able to be made by claimants. 
II Vicarious liability 
Exemplary damages are unlikely to be awarded in the New Zealand courts on a 
vicarious basis due to the purpose of attributing outrageous conduct to the actual 
offender as compared to their employer or agent. In S v Attorney-General Blanchard 
J distinguished the use of awarding compensatory damages on a vicarious basis 
which "enables the spreading oflosses amongst those better able to bear them. But 
since exemplary damages are not concerned with losses, that rationale is 
inapplicable"85 • In this case the negligence, in the form of child abuse, was 
committed by foster parents and the Department for Social Welfare was not held to 
be negligent in any way. Therefore punishing the Department, who have more 
resources than foster parents, would not deter the accident or injury from occurring 
again as it was not the Department who caused the outrageous conduct. 
This decision has not deterred other victims of abuse from seeking claims 
against the Child, Youth and Family Services and at May 2005 there were 29 
84 Hobson v Attorney-General above n 3. 
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negligence and other claims against the department seeking more than $30 million in 
damages86 . It could be argued that the court, in this case at least, is splitting hairs 
over the vicarious liability issue in order to make the claim for exemplary damages 
more difficult to achieve. 
However, vicarious liability was an important issue in the Couch hearing. At 
first, the judges reminded the counsel that "generally there was no vicarious liability 
for exemplary damages"87 The judges were troubled by the informal agreement 
between the counsel that the probation officer would not be the defendant due to 
medical and other reasons and instead the Attorney-General would be the named 
defendant and would indemnify her if found liable. Blanchard J was concerned that 
the appellant was too focused on the sins of the Probation Officer and stated:88 
it's going to be exceedingly difficult to get home on exemplary damages on Ms X .... she might 
be quite negligent but is she deserving of being punished ... .it might be a different case if the 
allegation is of systematic negligence against the Crown ... there could be theoretically at least 
direct liability for the Department's own sins in not having a proper structure in place. 
By finding the Department primarily liable, the Court would not have to be 
shoehorned into "altering the receive law about liability for exemplary damages on a 
vicarious basis89" and could still focus the cause of action and resulting damages on 
the Department who they thought would possibly be more deserving of punishment 
rather than the probation officer. Later in the hearing the appellant's counsel agreed 
to plead both for the Department and the Supervising Officer as the primary parties. 
85 S v Attorney-General above n 23 , para 90 Blanchard J. 
86 Kay Martin "CYF faces lawsuits for $30m" (19 May 2005) Th e Dominion Post Wellington. 
87 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n 1, 5 Tipping J. 
88 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n l , 50 Blanchard J. 
89 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n l, 5 Anderson J. 
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This may be an important indication by the Supreme Court that they are willing 
to punish a public authority for systematic negligence if the conduct was bad enough 
to meet the test for exemplary damages. If this is so, they would be going more in 
the direction that Hammond J took in the Court of Appeal suggesting that courts 
should address the "inadequate institutional response90 " by using tort law. However, 
this would be a change in direction from the Court of Appeal's narrow test for 
exemplary damages and desire to avoid meddling in public policy as followed by 
Chambers J in the Court of Appeal decision. This would be surprising considering 
the Supreme Court judges were all on the Court of Appeal bench previously. 
III Outrageous conduct 
In 1982 the Court of Appeal in Donselaar v Donselaar held that exemplary 
damages fell outside the statutory bar on damages for personal injury covered by the 
accident compensation scheme. This has been confirmed by Parliament in the 1998 
and 2001 amendment acts . 
Around the same time the criteria used to award exemplary damages in New 
Zealand was being developed with the Taylor v Beere91 case in which Richardson J 
referred to "contumelious disregard of the plaintiffs rights, high handed disregard of 
the rights of the plaintiff, or behaving in an outrageous or heinous manner, or 
oppressively or flagrantly. "92 The test for exemplary damages was generally 
confined to cases of intentional harm in personal injury cases. However, in an 
90 Hobson v Attorney-General above n 3 para 75 Hammond J. 
9 1 Taylor v Beere [ 1982] 1 NZLR 81 (CA) Cooke, Richardson, Somers JJ. 92 Taylor v Beere Ibid, 90-91 . 
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attempt to widen the scope for claimants after the 1992 Act "lawyers argued that 
exemplary damages should be available in cases of "gross" negligence as well 11 93. 
This test has developed over the years in reaction to judicial concern over 
exemplary damaged being used to top up accident compensation entitlements. 
In 2002 the case of a pathologist, Dr Bottrill94, presented another opportunity 
for the Court of Appeal to restrict the use of exemplary damages back to needing 
conscious wrongdoing or subjective recklessness for a claim to succeed. This made 
the cause of action more difficult to prove than the usual negligence tests in torts. 
The Bottrill case was appealed to the Privy Council who overturned the Court 
of Appeal case with a 3-2 split deciding that intentional wrongdoing was not 
necessary, Lord Nicholls stated: 95 
exemplary damages award is an expression of the court's condemnation of conduct which 
satisfies the criterion of outrageousness, the criterion would overwhelmingly involve 
intentional wrongdoing or conscious recklessness, but it would be "imprudent" to assume that 
in the absence of either, a defendant's negligent conduct could never give rise to a justifiable 
feeling of outrage calling for an award, "never say never" is a sound judicial admonition. 
The decision cited cases across Australia, Canada and the United States to rule 
intentional wrongdoing or conscious recklessness was not essential for exemplary 
damages. Lord Nicholls considered it unlikely that there would be a great increase 
in total claims due the jurisdiction in New Zealand which is exercised with restraint 
and with moderate awards. The minority view agreed with the Court of Appeal's 
criteria of "deliberate risk-taking" 96 • 
93 John Miller above n 15,413. 
94 Bottri/1 v A above n 60, para 41 . 
95 A v Bottri/1 [2003] 2 NZLR 721 (UK.PC) per Lord Nicholls, para 26. 
96 Susan Couch v Attorney-Genera/ above n I, 39 Tipping J. 
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There was some discussion at the hearing as to whether the Court of Appeal or 
the Privy Council test for the Bottrill case should be used with Tipping J saying it 
was "very likely"97 to go back to the Court of Appeal test. This may be because the 
judges feel the local conditions including the Accident Compensation legislation 
were not given enough weight by the Privy Council. It should also be noted that 
Tipping J wrote the Court of Appeal decision for the Bottrill case. The appellant has 
argued that they will meet the conditions of either test as the Probation Officer was 
reckless as she "closed her eyes to the consequences of what was going on"98 
One difficulty with either Bottrill test is the discretion by the judges in what 
conduct constitute an acceptable level of outrage. The Privy Council test is more 
subjective compared to the Court of Appeal test. As the court said in McDemott v 
Wallace99 : 
It might be said that Mr Wallace has persisted in declining to front up to the outrageousness of 
what he did, but in fairness to him that was dependent on judicial characterisation of the 
relevant behaviour. 
Applied to the Couch case, in the Court of Appeal decision Chambers J 
compared the level of negligence in the Bottrill case to that in the Couch case when 
he said: 100 
in some very rare cases, ie Bottrill, grossly negligent manner directly inflicted personal injury 
on the plaintiff, but that is certainly not the present case "that example is a mile away from any 
conceivable view of the facts here 
97 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n 1, 38 Tipping J. 
98 Susan Couch v Attorney-Genera! above n 1 37 Henry J. 
99 McDermott v Wallace above n 83, para 103. 
100 Hobson v Attorney-Genera! above n 3, para 153 , Chambers J. 
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This is a difficult comparison as negligent human behaviour is caused by a 
multitude of factors. Both Bottrill and the probation officer ( or Department) had a 
duty to protect the public and both allegedly failed in their duty. However, the 
context for their conduct was very different. Therefore, it is a difficult test for juries 
to come to terms with as they are likely to look at the results of the conduct rather 
than the level of outrageousness of the conduct and after all , pain and suffering is an 
intangible loss. 
Due to the uncertainty of this test and the difficulty for claimants in meeting its 
criteria it is necessary to consider other options for claimants with circumstances 
similar to Susan Couch's. 
IV FUTURE OPTIONS 
At present there is not a satisfactory system to punish public authorities or 
deter them from causing future accidents. The judiciary is generally reluctant to 
interfere with gaps in the Accident Compensation regime and "seem to be content to 
leave any perceived injustices to be dealt with by Parliament. 10 1 Although there has 
been a hybrid of control mechanisms to encourage accountability in the State sector, 
these do not prevent accidents from reoccurring or victims of personal injury from 
seeking justice through litigation. The following options are not exhaustive but offer 
options to the current situation. 
101 John Miller, above n 15, 420. 
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A Compensation schemes 
The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 could be 
amended in various ways to better answer the needs of victims of negligence. This is 
for Parliament to decide, but the judiciary could give some indication of what is 
needed in the Couch decision. The benefit in this option is that, compared to tort 
law, a statutory based compensation scheme is fairer and more efficient due to the 
distributive justice component. 
To do this the scheme must return to the principles of 'comprehensive 
entitlement' and 'real compensation' proposed in the Woodhouse Report. Lump sum 
payments should be increased for the seriously injured and keep up with inflation. 
Common law standards of entitlement should be used to determine levels of 
compensation. 102 However it is doubtful that this would be politically popular choice 
due to the need to reallocate scarce resources. It is also unlikely to stem the flow of 
claimants as it would not address the lack of accountability by public authorities. 
An alternative statutory based compensation scheme for victims of crime could 
fill the gap for the victims and their families who do not received accident 
compensation such as Ms Couch. It may also stem the flow of victims seeking 
justice in litigation. There is support for this proposal from the Sensible Sentencing 
Trust, David Carruthers and the Human Rights Commission. Justice Minister, Mark 
Burton said victim's compensation will be considered by the Justice and Electoral 
Select Committee as part of the Inquiry into Victims Rights. 103 
Alongside improved compensation, the community needs to be more 
responsible for preventing the accidents from occurring. This is the Woodhouse 
102 Richard Gaskin, above n 38 , 217. 
103 Kathy Webb "Crime victims ' should get compo from state"' (3 September 2007) The Dominion Post, 
Wellington, Al. 
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principle that has failed the most in practice. A public policy of injury prevention 
needs to be instigated. Again, this would require a reallocation of scarce resources. 
B Public inquiries, commission of inquiries 
The increase in use of inquiries by government is also result of the decrease in 
public confidence in public authorities. One example of such an inquiry is the 
Commission of Inquiry into the collapse of a viewing platform at Cave Creek near 
Punakaiki in which 14 people died in 1995.104 A key finding ofJudge Noble's report 
was:1 os 
No government department can do its job without adequate resourcing . .. Here, the evidence is 
clear that the Department of Conservation lacked, and continues to lack those resources. For 
future safety that must change. 
As a result Department for Conservation pulled down all unsafe platforms, 
bridges and huts and had an increase in funding. Some public who enjoyed the use 
of those facilities would say the result was over-cautious and to the detriment of the 
public interest showing that it is not just tort law that can result in a retracting of 
services. Perhaps more important was the enactment that meant government 
departments would be able to be prosecuted under health and safety and building 
legislation. 106 
104 Judge Noble Report: Commission of Inquiry into the collapse of a viewing platform at Cave Creek 
near Punakaiki on the West Coast (Department of Conservation, Wellington, 1995). 105 Judge Noble, Ibid, summary from the epilogue. 
106 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 s 3. 
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The Law Commission is currently doing a project on the role of public 
inquiries in New Zealand. They suggested: 107 
There may be a question as to how broad the ongoing role for public inquiries is in this area. 
Our view is that while the need for such inquiries may increasingly be confined to major 
disasters or significant state sector failures , there is still a need for them where public 
confidence demands a greater impression of independence than other statutory officers and 
bodies can provide. 
They are pointing to the independence of public inquiries compared to 
statutory bodies such as the Ombudsman or a special tribunal such as the 
Weathertight Homes Resolution Service. This independence helps assure the public 
that the state is not looking after itself. 
Whether a public inquiry would satisfy the victim's needs is doubtful however. 
The appellant's counsel at the Hearing disagreed with the idea of a Commission of 
Inquiry saying "this is not an issue of public accountability, it's an issue of the victim 
being able to have the wrongdoer account to her" 108 • 
Therefore, the victims want something more personal and directed at the wrong 
done to them. An injured victim with a right to sue has more incentive to call the 
offender to account than a faceless public official, who does not have the same 
commitment or understanding of the wrong done. 
107 New Zealand Law Commission The Role of Public Inquiries: Issues Paper One (NZLC IP 1, 
Wellington, 2007) para 27 . 
108 Susan Couch v Attorney-General above n I, 36 Henry J. 
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C New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) offers an alternative and 
possibly more powerful means for claiming damages when rights have been 
breached. Since the 1994 decision Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent's Case/ 09 
compensation has been an available remedy for a breach of the BORA. This remedy 
is of particular relevance to the harm done by public authorities as Hammond J noted 
in Manga v Attorney-General: 110 
Cases based upon violations of the Bill of Rights are about the vindication of statutory policies 
which are not "just" private: they have overarching, public dimensions ... The object is to 
promote mutual justice, and to protect the weak from the strong. 
Unlike private law remedies, such as exemplary damages, public law remedies 
can be tailored to the particular interest protected and in the particular contextual 
setting. 111 As Blanchard J stated in the recent Taunoa v Attorney General decision 
the remedy should be "sufficient to deter any repetition by agents of the State and to 
vindicate the breach of right in question" 112 Or as McGrath J stated, a BORA remedy 
"looks to repair the social harm caused by the breach ... and secure[ e] the future 
respect of the State for the right concemed" 113 • Therefore the advantage of BORA 
remedies is that they redress the public outrage and have deterrence purposes rather 
than the narrow punitive purposes used by New Zealand judiciary for exemplary 
damages 
109 
Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent 's Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) Cooke P, Casey, Hardie 
Boys, Gault, McKay JJ. 
110 
Manga v Attorney-Genera/ [2000] 2 NZLR 65, 81 (HC) Hammond J. 
111 Attorney-General v Taunoa [2006] 2 NZLR 457 para 301 (CA) Hammond J. 
112 
Taunoa and Ors v The Attorney General and Anor (31 August 2007) [2007] NZSC 70 para 253 Blanchard 
J. 
113 Taunoa and Ors v The Attorney General and A nor Ibid paras 366-367 McGrath J. 
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However, there are issues around the use of the remedy for claimants such as 
Ms Couch. It would depend on what the BORA breach was and who caused the 
breach. It could be difficult to prove that the breach to Susan Couch's life or safety 
(sections 8 and 9) was caused by the Probation Service's poor supervision of William 
Bell. It is more likely to be available to the family of Liam Ashley who was 
murdered by an inmate while in a prison van 114 as there is a tighter connection 
between the breach and the actor. Liam's family would be in the same position as 
Tai Hobson and would unlikely to succeed in a negligence cause of action, therefore 
a BORA application would be an alternative way to seek justice through the courts. 
Another issue is that most BORA cases also include a cause of action in torts. 
Hammond J in the Manga and Taunoa decision has advocated a "top-up" approach 
on this issue with the tort damages calculated first then topped up for BORA 
purposes. 115 Linked to this issue is whether the Accident Compensation bar covers 
BORA claims. In Wilding v AG Blanchard J stated: 116 
in the case of a claim based on or related to personal injury, the legislature has decided, in 
enacting the personal injury compensation legislation, that the effective remedy is found in the 
entitlements under the scheme. It is not for the Courts to question the adequacy of those 
entitlements and to supplement them by an award of damages quantified directly or indirectly 
by reference to the personal injury. 
This view was affirmed by Blanchard J in the recent Taunoa v Attorney-
General decision. 11 7 However, in the Wilding decision Blanchard J also said 
compensation could be made to an 'affront ofrights' so long as it was not directed at 
114 "Family to sue Crown over death" ( 12 August 2007) Sunday Star Times , Auckland. 
115 Attorney-General v Taunoa above n 24, para 298 Hammond J. 
116 Wilding v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 787 para 15 (CA) Blanchard J for the Court. 
111 Taunoa and Ors v The Attorney General and Anor above n 112 para 259 Blanchard J. 
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the physical injury. 11 8 This 'affront' approach is still to be settled in New Zealand 
courts as are the quantum of damages that BORA claimants should received. 
D Return to tort law 
A more likely option is an increased use of tort law for negligent action 
resulting in significant personal injury or death. As Hammond J suggested, a new 
type of negligence claim could be created by the courts to force public authorities to 
become more accountable when causing injuries through their own negligence. 
Tort law is based on a set of "familiar and intuitively compelling ideas about 
responsibility and justice" that the public understand. 119 The court system is seen to 
be more independent than state funded compensation schemes. 
Tort law has benefits other than compensation. For example, the wrongdoer 
has to pay, thereby making it more likely they will not re-offend. There is education 
of the public as to what are reasonable and unreasonable standards of conduct. And 
there is the important ombudsman or accountability factor. 120 
However, a disadvantage of the tort system is that "transaction costs are 
enonnous and consume great resources, thereby returning valuable benefits to only a 
minority of accident victims. 121 United States studies show that personal injury 
victims receive about two-thirds of the compensation paid, the rest goes to pay legal 
expenses and expenses. 122 That is partly why the Accident Compensation scheme 
was introduced in the first place. Court action impedes the rehabilitation of victims 
11 8 Wilding v Attorney-General above n 116 para 16. 
11 9 Carol Harlow, above n 18, 92. 
12° Carol Harlow, above n 18, 100. 
121 Rt Hon Professor Sir Geoffrey Palmer "The Design of Compensation Systems: Tort Principles Rule, 
OK?" 29 Valparaiso University Law Review, 1115, 1120. 
122 Mike Ross "No-fault liability defies human nature" (29 November 2002) National Business Review 
Auckland. 
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due to the time taken to get to court, and clogs up the court with matters that could be 
more efficiently dealt with by administrative means. 
However, other common law countries are dealing with the decline of the 
welfare state with an increased use of tort law. In the United Kingdom tort law is 
assuming "last ditch function of filling gaps in declining welfare services for the few 
who are not protected adequately. The mood of judicial responsibility is to take care 
of vulnerable parties. 123 
The floodgates argument is able to be responded to by introducing measure to 
place limits on quantum of damages given by the courts as seen by McDermott v 
Wallace. In the one-off cases, where an individual seeks damages in court for the 
wrong done to them, the cost and nature of litigation will act as a natural filter to 
unmeritorious claims. 124 
Tort law can be used in combination with other options as seen by the Bottrill 
case where an objective assessment of Dr Bottrill's level of awareness was made by a 
Ministerial Inquiry. 125 
The Couch decision by the Supreme Court will help to detennine the place tort 
law has in improving the accountability of public bodies such as the Department of 
Corrections and thereby satisfying the needs of victims such as Ms Couch. But is 
punishing the Department of Corrections for failings six years after the offence really 
worthwhile? 
123 Carol Harlow, above n 18, 5. 
124 Susan Kneebone Tort liability of public authorities (North Ryde, LBC Information Services, 1998) 45. 125 A P Duffy QC, DK Barrett, MA Duggan Report of the Ministerial Inquiry into the Under-Reporting 
of Cervical Smear Abnormalities in the Gisborne Region (Wellington, 10 April 2001). 
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E Political pressure 
It could be argued that the above options are not necessary as the political 
pressures are enough to hold public officials accountable. An example given by 
Lawrence Rosenthal is the how the failures of the New Orleans' levee system caused 
by Hurricane Katrina were the result of easily foreseeable and readily repairable 
faults, which would make out a classic case of negligence. "Any instance of 
government bungling that compromises the public's safety is likely to have potent 
political consequences" 126 • However, this is an example of a botched government 
response that, so far, has had impotent political consequences. 
While this theory may be partly correct for large scale calamities such as the 
Cave Creek disaster, it is less obvious for cases of systematic failings such as by the 
Department of Corrections in this case. Since 2001 there have been more extreme 
cases of unnecessary deaths due to systematic failures by the Department of 
Corrections as shown above by the Graeme Burton example. This shows that the 
Department did not respond to the RSA killings as well as could be expected and, 
therefore, political pressure was not sufficient to improve the accountability of the 
Department. 
V CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court hearing for Susan Couch raises important public policy 
questions on whether the judiciary should interfere in public policy regarding 
compensating victims and making public authorities accountable for their mistakes. 
It is obvious that the Accident Compensation scheme no longer fulfills its original 
principles of comprehensive entitlement and real compensation. Victims of 
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negligence by public authorities tum to litigation in the sole hope of being awarded 
exemplary damages. Since the mid 1990s the New Zealand judiciary has narrowed 
the purpose of exemplary damages in order to discourage it from being used by 
claimants to top up their compensation. This strict use of this remedy has lessened 
its effectiveness. 
Public authorities will react to judicial condemnation due to the resulting bad 
publicity. However, litigation is an expensive and slow procedure for the claimants. 
A better solution would be for victims of serious personal injury to receive real 
compensation similar to what they would get under common law. This could be 
through victim compensation or the Accident Compensation regime. If this does not 
occur, the judiciary should loosen the test for exemplary damages so claimants get 
the accountability and vindication they deserve. The judiciary could use the 
McDermott v Wallace test to take into account compensation already given to the 
claimant. Legislation could be amended to give the judiciary more indication of the 
criteria to be used in detennining awards . Official inquires could be held to 
determine the relevant facts as was done in the Bottrill case127 or to prevent future 
accidents from occurring as with the Cave Creek inquiry. Victims should also be 
able to seek public law remedies for breaches of their human rights. 
In this way a silo of remedies would be available to ensure public authorities 
are held accountable for their failings and fulfill their given objectives in a way that 
best serves the public interest. 
126 
Lawrence Rosenthal, above n 41 , 850. 
127 
A P Duffy QC, above n 125. 
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